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The constitutional protection of private property is rooted in the notion that individual rights ought 
to be insulated from the tyranny of the majority. However, as public choice theory teaches us, 
democratic decision-making suffers from another systemic failure that is no less pernicious, no 
less ubiquitous, but less transparent: interest groups are capable of steering government to favor 
their narrow interests at the expense of diffuse citizens and the broad public interest. In this Essay 
we argue that this ‘capture’ characteristically results in anticompetitive regulatory measures that 
inflate the prices of products and services above their competitive market price or reduce their 
quality. Such measures transfer wealth from the many to the few, as they diminish the value of 
diffuse citizens' disposable income in terms of purchasing power. We propose to conceive of this 
loss as a potentially unconstitutional taking of the diffuse citizens’ property. Our account 
challenges the Madisonian assumption, embedded in the Constitution, that constitutions must 
protect the property rights of the propertied minority against the tyranny of the deprived majority. 
We argue that the Constitution must also limit another type of taking, effected when a minority 
solicits anticompetitive government measures that diminish the value of the disposable income of 
the marginalized majority. Accordingly, anticompetitive regulation catering to special interests 
will be deemed prima facie unconstitutional unless it is necessary to promote public purposes.  
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The constitutional protection of private property is rooted in the notion that individual rights and 
liberties ought to be protected against the tyranny of the majority. James Madison, who viewed 
the protection of property as a key object of republican government,1 was ostensibly guided by a 
concern that majoritarian rule will systematically fail to protect the interests of the propertied 
minority. Madison cautioned that, while questions of public policy must be determined by the will 
of the majority, the "majority may trespass on the rights of the minority,"2 and stressed that "In all 
cases where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the minority are 
in danger."3 
However, studies in public choice theory teach us that the democratic political process suffers from 
another systemic weakness which may be no less pernicious, no less ubiquitous, but less 
transparent than the majoritarian failure that Madison had anticipated. As interest group theory has 
exposed, the diffuse public is limited in its capacity to affect public decisions through the public 
political process, while concentrated interest groups possess an unequaled ability to 'capture' 
lawmakers and regulators and steer them to shape public policy that favors their narrow interests 
at the expense of the broad public interest.4 Therefore, conversely to Madison's view, in the 
ubiquitous cases where a minority is united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the 
majority are likely to be in danger. 
The takings jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court is aligned with the spirit of Madison's 
counter-majoritarian conception of constitutional property rights, focusing on the taking of private 
property of one or a few owners for the pursuit of a public interest.5 The Court has long held that 
the purpose of the Takings Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."6 
Considering the lessons of interest group theory, this Essay argues that the constitutional protection 
of private property should sometimes serve the opposite purpose – namely, to bar government 
from unjustly imposing economic injuries on the public in the pursuit of special interests.  
This contention, if correct, should lead us to reexamine what kinds of private interests ought to be 
conceptualized as amounting to constitutionally protected property rights, and when and how 
government measures imposing burdens on those rights ought to pass judicial muster for their 
constitutionality. The Essay proposes such a reconceptualization, arguing that anticompetitive 
government measures that are motivated by special interests' capture should be conceptualized as 
potentially unconstitutional takings of diffuse citizens' private property. Such measures tend to 
result in massive transfers of wealth from the many to the few, as they diminish the disposable 
                                                          
1 JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 16 (1990).  
2 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: 
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income of the diffuse majority in terms of its purchasing power (i.e. the quantity and quality of 
products and services that can be purchased with a unit of currency). We suggest that the value of 
disposable income in terms of purchasing power must be conceived as constitutionally protected 
property, and that anticompetitive government measures that diminish it to the benefit of special 
interests, should be conceptualized as effecting its unconstitutional taking if not justified as 
necessary to promote a public purpose. Furthermore, we suggest that such a conceptualization 
should give rise to judicial review that could effectively preempt the adverse influences of special 
interest groups on government.  
Other scholars have suggested that interest group theory justifies and makes desirable more 
rigorous judicial review. Among others, Erwin Chemerinsky suggested that the executive and 
legislative branches' proneness to capture warrants more rigorous judicial review,7 and Cass 
Sunstein argued that the courts should invalidate legislation that benefits certain groups resulting 
solely from their ability to obtain it by exercising raw political power.8 The novelty in our approach 
is that we, for the first time, give a ‘name’ to a specific type of a ubiquitous if inconspicuous type 
of government-imposed wealth transfer that caters to special interests at the expense of the diffuse 
public, bringing it under the framework of the constitutional protection of private property and 
thereby justify more rigorous judicial scrutiny of its manifestations. The conception of individuals 
belonging to the diffuse public as bearers of rights, protecting them against the taking of their 
private property by anticompetitive regulation, provides these individuals with voice where they 
are not heard and standing to demand judicial review as a mechanism that could assist them in 
overcoming the debilitating collective action problem that they face.  
Our innovation adds constitutional underpinnings to those antitrust scholars who suggested to 
apply federal antitrust law to anticompetitive government measures.9 However, we believe that 
constitutional law is the appropriate framework to address such measures as they pertain to the 
systemic failures of the democratic process. Constitutional protection is required to limit the 
discretion of legislators who define the scope of antitrust law as they actively seek to attract special 
interests.     
The Essay proceeds as follows: Section I, discusses the problem of anticompetitive government 
measures designed to favor special interest groups at the expense of the diffuse public. Section II 
provides the justification for conceptualizing anticompetitive government measures as potentially 
unconstitutional takings of diffuse citizen's property: Section II(a) establishes that such measures 
could be seen as government-imposed transfers of wealth which diminish the property of the 
diffuse public; and section II(b) argues that, in contrast with other conceivable types of 
government-imposed wealth transfers, anticompetitive government measures are worthy of more 
                                                          
7 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
43, 46-47, 78, 80-81 (1989). 
8 Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); on the need for more rigorous judicial review 
in light of interest group capture see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 
TUL. L. REV. 849, 874-75 (1980); BERNARD SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 265-303 (1980).   
9  See John S. Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 748 (1986); see also 
William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory Process, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1109-15, 1122-25 (1981). 
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rigorous judicial scrutiny, as the vulnerability of diffuse citizens to the systemic failures of the 
political process merits constitutional protection of their property interests . We argue that our 
justification, focused on the failures of the political process, is supported by the original 
understanding of the constitutional protection of private property, which was guided by the 
Framers’ concerns about a political majority abusing its power against the propertied minority.  
Section III will propose and discuss a framework for constitutional protection of the diffuse 
public's property as well as the appropriate tests for judicial review of anticompetitive government 
measures. We shall suggest the such measures should be invalidated if they result from special 
interest influence and if they are not necessary to promote their purported public purpose. Section 
IV concludes.  
 
I – Interest Group Theory and Anticompetitive Government Measures 
Economic regulation is inescapably involved in allocating and reallocating burdens and 
entitlements across society. Some allocative effects are caused by direct physical interference with 
economic interests, such as the physical taking of private land for public use, while others are 
caused by indirect interference with economic interests through regulation and macro-economic 
policy. Low exchange rates may serve the interests of exporters at the expense of importers; 
decreasing the corporate tax rate may serve the interests of businesses while harming the interests 
of those favored by extensive public services; some regulations may serve broad public interests 
in health and safety while imposing high compliance costs on businesses; and some regulations 
may limit commercial competition placing increased costs on consumers. 
Under a traditional account of government regulation, such allocative effects are the product of 
policy choices aimed at pursuing public interests determined by the democratic political process 
and public-spirited lawmakers and state executives. However, while this account may serve as a 
fair normative theory of how government ought to function, studies in public choice theory suggest 
that it fails as a positive account of the actual behavior of lawmakers and state executives. Under 
the public choice account of regulation, policymakers are seen as self-interested agents that are 
often incentivized to be more responsive to narrow special interest groups than to the broad public. 
As George Stigler suggested, that is because groups that stand to win or lose the most from 
government action are incentivized to make the greatest effort to 'capture' policymakers and 
regulators in order to ensure that regulation serves their narrow interests.10  
Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action11 provided the explanation for why Stigler’s findings 
could be generalized: smaller groups are more likely to succeed at shaping favorable public 
policies by capturing policymakers, at the expense of the larger groups that try to shape policy 
through the political system.12 Olson demonstrated that the problem of collective action arises 
                                                          
10 GEORGE STIGLER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC REGULATION (1971). On capture theory see also: MARVER 
BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1977); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF 
CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1900-1916 (1963).  
11 See Olson, supra note 4; see also: Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 
211 (1976). 
12 See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION (1987). 
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when large groups attempt to produce a public good which will be accessible to all of its members. 
That is because Individual members of the group, being rational and intent on pursuing their self-
interest, will seek to enjoy the fruits of the joint enterprise at the lowest possible investment of 
their own personal resources. The more the group is large and homogenous, the less its members 
are incentivized to contribute to the joint enterprise, as they are aware that if other members 
succeed in bringing about the desired result, they would be able to reap the benefits while avoiding 
the costs. In contrast, when a concentrated interest group attempts to promote a shared interest that 
would produce benefits accessible only to its members, it will succeed in overcoming the collective 
action problem. Individual members of the group would be sufficiently incentivized to invest 
resources in the joint enterprise, as the reward would be more valuable per capita, and the small 
size of the group would reduce the costs of monitoring and imposing sanctions on members who 
do not contribute to the effort. 
Members of the diffuse public face a collective action problem when they seek to shape public 
policies or at least obtain information on public decisions affecting their interests.13 Because 
members of the broad public make up a large and diffuse group, they have a low per capita 
incentive to invest resources in collecting information on public decisions, and much less so to 
invest time in active participation in the public political process. As Anthony Downs observed, the 
resulting information gaps between voters and representatives are the primary problem in 
representative democracy.14 Generally speaking, diffuse voters are not familiar with the processes 
of public decision-making and with particular decisions affecting their interests, nor are they 
capable of assessing the reasons and justifications behind particular decisions. At the same time, 
concentrated interest groups are uniquely capable of overcoming the same collective action 
problem, due to their small size and particular interests. They can thus take advantage of the 
information gaps between the broad public and its representatives, and even exacerbate those gaps 
by influencing the media, and effectively invest resources in lobbying, campaign finance or other 
forms of support or retaliation that may impel decision-makers to sway public decisions in their 
favor.15  
By capturing public decision-makers, interest groups regularly shape regulations and macro-
economic policies that restrain existing or potential competition. They can steer policymakers to 
impose restrictions on international or interstate trade, establish licensing regimes or other rules 
that limit or impose high market entry costs on new entrants,16 limit the quantity of output or set 
the prices of certain goods, enact rules that allow competitors to coordinate prices, or enact 
legislation exempting certain industries from antitrust laws. Such measures artificially increase the 
market power of interest groups and allow them to engage in monopolistic behavior, charging 
supra-competitive prices or reducing the quality of the goods and services that they produce or 
trade. These, in turn, result in massive transfers of wealth from the many to the few, by increasing 
                                                          
13 Susanne Lohmann, An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 809-12, 
820-26 (1998). 
14 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957). 
15 This understanding was further developed by Elinor Ostrom, who exposed the nature of successful cooperation 
relating to resources that are accessible to only to particular groups. See: ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE 
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).  
16 Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1, 35 (2002). 
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profits for the favored interest groups and reducing the value of the disposable income of diffuse 
citizens in terms of purchasing power. 
Cases of public restraints of competition influenced by special interests are very common and well 
documented: Gabriel Kolko argued in 1963 that federal regulation between 1900-1916, which was 
commonly seen as pursuing public progressive interests, was to a great extent influenced by 
business interests in curbing competition;17 A study by Ralph Nader published in 1973 found 
extensive anticompetitive effects of federal regulation in the fields of communication, energy, 
transportation and others;18 In his seminal work describing the economic theory of regulation, 
George Stigler exposed the ways in which the interest group of railroad companies used state 
authority to preempt competition from truck drivers in the early 1930's;19 In 1980, Congress passed 
legislation authorizing certain vertical restraints on competition in the soft drink industry, 
influenced by soft drink bottlers such as 'Coca-Cola' and 'Pepsico' who sought immunity from 
antitrust law in response to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) litigation against them;20 In the early 
2000's auto dealers succeeded in restraining competition by attaining legislation in all 50 states 
prohibiting direct vehicle sales by manufacturers and online sellers without a franchise presence,21 
and real estate brokers successfully lobbied for state laws and regulations barring professionals 
from offering limited brokerage services for lower fees instead of full package services, and 
preventing brokers from passing part of their commissions to consumers;22 In 2003, the 
pharmaceutical industry invested $116 million in convincing Congress to ban Medicare from 
negotiating for lower drug prices, resulting in an estimated transfer of $90 billion per year from 
consumers to the pharmaceutical industry.23 To be sure, these are only a few representative 
examples. 
Extant law exacerbates the problem of anticompetitive government measures as it immunizes 
public competition restraints, and private parties acting in accordance with them, from antitrust 
law, leaving no legal tools at the hands of consumers or competitors that could be used to challenge 
anticompetitive government measures detrimental to their interests. Several Supreme Court 
decisions have affirmed that federal regulations prevail when conflicting with antitrust law,24 and 
the antitrust “state action doctrine”, first established in the 1943 case of Parker v. Brown,25 holds 
that the Sherman Act does not apply to competition restraints produced by official state action, 
                                                          
17  GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1900-1916 
(1963). 
18 THE MONOPOLY MAKERS: RALPH NADER'S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON REGULATION AND COMPETITION 35, 103, 
193, 227, 319 (Mark J. Green ed., 1973). 
19 George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 8 (1971). 
20 Leonard R. Stein, The Soft Drink Interband Competition Act of 1980: Antitrust Loses Its Fizz, 18 HARV. J. LEGIS. 
91 (1981); A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, FEDERAL STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAW 49-50 
(2007). 
21 Timothy J. Muris, State Intervention/State Action - A U.S. Perspective, FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 517, 520 (2004). 
22 Letter from the FTC & the Dep’t of Justice to Gov. Matt Blunt (May 23, 2005); Letter from the FTC & the Dep’t 
of Justice to Loretta R. DeHay, Gen. Counsel, Tex. Real Estate Comm’n (Apr. 20, 2005). 
23 TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 56 (2018). 
24 See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 279-84 (2007); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices 
of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004). 
25  317 U.S. 341 (1943).   
7 
 
provided that they are part of a 'clearly articulated' state policy and are actively supervised by the 
state.26 The Parker doctrine is based on principles of state sovereignty and federalism. In the 
Parker decision, the Court found "nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history 
which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities 
directed by its legislature".27 In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., the Court 
reasoned that "The rationale of Parker was that, in light of our national commitment to federalism, 
the general language of the Sherman Act should not be interpreted to prohibit anticompetitive 
actions by the States in their governmental capacities as sovereign regulators."28  
Besides the Parker doctrine, the corollary Noerr-Pennington29 doctrine holds that "the federal 
antitrust laws also do not regulate the conduct of private individuals in seeking anticompetitive 
action from the government."30 The doctrine, based on the premise that antitrust laws may not 
impinge upon First Amendment rights to petition government, exempts private parties from 
antitrust liability even if they seek anticompetitive government measures with anticompetitive 
intent or by wrongful conduct.31 
The immunity government measures could confer upon interest groups wishing to engage in 
anticompetitive practices makes such measures all the more valuable for interest groups and 
increases their incentive to influence government. As the former chair of the FTC, Timothy Muris, 
stated: 
"Protecting competition by focusing solely on private restraints [as antitrust law does] is 
like trying to stop the water flow at a fork in a stream by blocking only one channel. A 
system that sends private price fixers to jail, but makes government regulation to fix prices 
legal, has not completely addressed the competitive problem. It has simply dictated the 
form that the problem will take."32 
Interestingly, the Parker and Noerr-Pennington doctrines could help demonstrate why federal 
antitrust law is ill fitted to address the problem of anticompetitive government measures, not just 
as a matter of law, but also as a matter of legal theory. As the Supreme Court once stated, “Parker 
and Noerr are complementary expressions of the principle that the antitrust laws regulate business, 
not politics."33 Indeed, we believe that rather than antitrust laws, anticompetitive government 
measures aimed to favor interest groups ought to be addressed by constitutional law, a body of law 
precisely intended to regulate politics. The problem we are addressing raises essentially 
                                                          
26 California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980). 
27 317 U.S. at 350-51 (1943). 
28 499 U.S. 365, at 374 (1991). 
29 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr 
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
30  499 U.S. at 379-80. 
31 Bayou Fleet, Inc. v. Alexander, 234 F.3d 852, 859 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Noerr-Pennington immunity applies to any 
concerted effort to sway public officials regardless of the private citizen's intent."); Armstrong Surgical Ctr., Inc. v. 
Armstrong County Memorial Hospital et al., 185 F.3d 154, 162 (3rd Cir. 1999) (stating that remedy for bribery, fraud, 
or deceit lies with laws that forbid such conduct, and cannot be premised on willingness of courts to look behind state 
action in context of antitrust litigation). 
32 Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CLL. L. REV. 165, 170 (2005). 
33 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 384 (1991). 
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constitutional questions concerning the failures of the political decision-making process and the 
normative constraints on the legitimate use of government power to transfer wealth between 
groups and individuals. 
The issue at hand is constitutional in another important sense. As Tim Wu argues in his recent 
book, antitrust law plays a "constitutional" role as it is was originally aimed to achieve a political 
goal alongside its economic goal. According to Wu, antitrust was serving as "a check on private 
power, by preventing the growth of monopoly corporations into something that might transcend 
the power of elected government to control."34 Wu turns our attention to the fact that the collective 
action problem, allowing concentrated interest groups to dominate the diffuse public in obtaining 
favorable public policy in the first place, is made worse by restraints on competition: as industries 
become more concentrated they can overcome their collective action problem more easily as fewer 
players can benefit from reduced coordination costs and increased benefits from the spoils of the 
desired political outcome.35 Interest groups could thus use their disproportionate political power 
to restrain competition, which in turn further increases their political power, in a vicious circle that 
corrupts the political process and perpetuates the control of private power over public policy. 
In what follows, we propose a response to this problem. We argue that such ‘captured’ government 
measures should be reconceptualized as potentially unconstitutional takings of diffuse citizens’ 




II – Conceptualizing Anticompetitive Government Measures as Potentially Unconstitutional 
Takings of Private Property 
At the outset, our proposition that anticompetitive government measures could be conceptualized 
as potentially unconstitutional takings of citizens' private property may seem questionable. We are 
accustomed to regard constitutional rights as counter-majoritarian constraints on government 
action, shielding individuals and minorities, and not the broad public, from unjust burdens. At the 
same time, we tend to view economic competition as the subject of antitrust law that is designed 
to ensure aggregate economic efficiency and aggregate consumer welfare rather than the protection 
of individual rights.36 
However, in this section we argue that anticompetitive government measures could and should be 
conceptualized as potentially unconstitutional takings of citizens' private property. Our argument 
is based on the contention that the constitutional protection of private property is designed to 
                                                          
34 WU, supra note 23, at 54. 
35 Id. at 58. 
36 See Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological 
Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023 (1987); For a different view the conceives of the Sherman Act as granting 
consumers property rights over the consumer surplus see: Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of 
the Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2349, 2351 (2013).  
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protect owners against purely private wealth transfers caused by the systemic failures of the 
democratic process. In section (a), we establish that anticompetitive government measures 
designed to favor special interest groups could be seen as government-imposed transfers of wealth 
that enrich interest groups while diminishing the property of the diffuse majority. Then, in section 
(b), we explain that in contrast with other conceivable types of government-imposed wealth 
transfers, anticompetitive government measures that transfer wealth from the many to the few by 
exploiting the political vulnerability of diffuse citizens are worthy of more rigorous constitutional 
scrutiny.  We find support for our argument also in the vision of the Framers of the Constitution 
whose concerns with the failures of the political process led them to delineate the types of private 
property interests that the Takings Clause should protect. 
 
a. Anticompetitive government measures as wealth transfers that diminish the property of the 
diffuse majority 
Government restraints on competition often result in above-market prices or below-market quality 
of affected goods or services. Subsequent to such measures, the diffuse group of consumers will 
have experienced a diminution of the value of their disposable income in terms of purchasing 
power – their earnings will now allow them to purchase less in quantity and/or quality of the same 
goods or services they could access before the measures. At the same time, the interest groups 
favored by anticompetitive measures will reap monopoly profits at the expense of their consumers. 
In this section, we aim to establish that it is possible to conceive of such effects as government-
imposed wealth transfers that diminish the property of diffuse citizens.  
This contention raises a conceptual problem. The distributive effect described above is not 
generated by a government action that directly expropriates wealth from diffuse citizens and 
allocates it to interest groups, but rather by the indirect modification of market prices. Since 
competitive markets prices are determined by transactions between willing buyers and sellers in 
voluntary market transactions, these prices may be viewed as external to the property rights of the 
parties. While it is true that the currency held by the diffuse citizens is indeed their private property, 
it would be problematic to suggest that this property right includes an entitlement to exchange 
some particular amount of their currency in return for a given good. From this perspective, 
anticompetitive government measures cannot be seen as diminishing private property, and they 
can hardly be seen as government-imposed wealth transfers, since their distributive effects reflect 
nothing more than the terms of voluntary transactions between private parties.37  
However, the notion that market prices are determined by willing buyers and sellers alone serves 
to obscure the role played by government in affecting prices by defining and enforcing property 
rights and regulating market activity. Such government actions are involved in determining market 
prices either by setting them directly or my modifying supply and demand or the relative 
bargaining powers of the parties. Anticompetitive government measures, by definition, affect 
deviations from the market prices that would be determined by competitive conditions. These 
                                                          




measures restrict the purchasing options of consumers, as a result of granting interest groups the 
power to artificially inflate prices beyond the level buyers and sellers on an equal footing of 
bargaining power would have agreed to. Such measures, despite their indirect nature, have clear 
distributive implications. Such implications are essentially no different from those of direct 
measures that directly take consumers' money and allocate them to interest groups.  
Correspondingly, the diminution of the value of money in terms of purchasing power is 
conceptually equivalent to the expropriation of money. That is because the money held by citizens 
is essentially a carrier of purchasing power. For example, if citizens possess $100, there is no 
difference between directly taking $20 away from them or creating an uncompetitive market that 
inflates the price tag of products such that $100 would allow them to purchase no more in quantity 
and quality of goods than $80 could purchase beforehand. Money, in contrast with other types of 
possessions, carries no independent value to its owners that cannot be reduced to its exchange 
value – the value of goods and services it could be exchanged for in the market. Therefore, if 
physical taking of money is an infringement of property, so is the diminution of its value in terms 
of purchasing power by artificially inflated prices. 
The contention that the right to property in money includes the protection of its value could be 
found in comparative constitutional law. For example, Hans-Jürgen Papier, a former President of 
the German Federal Constitutional Court, argued in 1973 that the guarantee of property found in 
Article 14 of the German Basic Law includes the protection of the value of money against changes 
in monetary policy, precisely because money is essentially a carrier of purchasing power.38 This 
wide-ranging argument was later rejected by the German Constitutional Court, given the 
impossibility of requiring the state to guarantee the value of money against the numerous factors 
that shape it.39 However, that decision is regarded as compatible with the view that the German 
constitution’s protection of private property extends to the responsibility of the state to guarantee 
the value of money by, inter-alia, maintaining a 'functioning monetary order' and institutionalizing 
the independence of the central bank, as well as its mandate to ensure price stability.40 To be sure, 
the question of whether monetary phenomenon such as inflation or currency devaluation could be 
seen as infringements of property rights is beyond the scope and purpose of this Essay, which 
focuses on the effect of anticompetitive government measures on the property rights of the diffuse 
public.  
Our understanding of the relationship between anticompetitive prices and harm to property could 
also be found in US jurisprudence. In the case of Reiter v. Sonotone Corp the Supreme Court found 
that "a consumer whose money has been diminished by reason of an antitrust violation has been 
injured in his 'property' within the meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act,"41 which provides that 
persons injured in their "business or property" by anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue 
                                                          
38  Hans-Jürgen Papier, Eigentumsgarantie und Geldentwertung, 98 ARCHIV DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 528 (1973). 
39  See Isabel Feichtner, Public Law's Rationalization of the Legal Architecture of Money: What Might Legal Analysis 
of Money Become, 17 GERMAN L.J. 875, 887 (2016); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] Mar. 31, 1998, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 97, 350. 
40 Feichtner, supra note 39, at 887. 
41 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). 
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for treble damages.42 The Court found that a consumer acquiring goods or services for personal 
use "is injured in 'property' when the price of those goods or services is artificially inflated by 
reason of the anticompetitive conduct complained of."43 While the Reiter decision recognizes 
injuries to property due to inflated prices caused by private competition restraints, we see no reason 
why the same should not hold true in the case of public competition restraints.  
 
b. Constitutional protection of property as a response to purely private wealth transfers effected 
by the systemic failures of the political process 
So far, we have established that anticompetitive government measures could be seen as effecting 
government-imposed wealth transfers that diminish the property of diffuse citizens. However, it 
does not simply follow from this conception that such measures should be considered potentially 
unconstitutional. After all, many evidently permissible government measures have profound 
redistributive implications. For example, government may progressively or regressively levy taxes 
and redistribute resources through spending, it may adopt zoning ordinances or generate public 
projects that affect the market value of private property, and it may enact labor and consumer 
protection laws that redistributes wealth by modifying the relative bargaining powers of private 
parties. While the Court recognized that government measures indirectly diminishing the value of 
private property may sometimes be considered compensable takings,44 the 'regulatory takings' 
doctrine is very limited in its application.45 as the Supreme Court explained when discussing the 
limits of mandating compensation for regulatory takings, "government hardly could go on if to 
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such 
change in the general law."46 
In this section, we argue that in contrast with other government measures that effect wealth 
transfers, anticompetitive government measures are worthy of more rigorous judicial scrutiny due 
to their propensity to violate a normative principle at the heart of the constitutional protection of 
private property – namely, that government actions that transfer wealth between persons in society 
ought to promote, or be aimed to promote, a public purpose rather than purely private ends. As we 
shall explain, anticompetitive measures are prone to violate this principle because the property 
interests of the diffuse majority are susceptible to be harmed by a systemic failure of the political 
decision-making process - the interest group capture failure. 
                                                          
42 The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 15 
43 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). 
44 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("if a regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a 
taking"). The Supreme Court developed the doctrine of regulatory takings further in Penn Central Transport Co v. 
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 
(1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Kaiser Aetna v. United States 444 U.S. 164 
(1979); Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
45 The Supreme Court refrained from setting a bright-line test of when regulation diminishing private property "goes 
too far" but determined that compensation is due for the very limited category of regulations that deny property owners 
"all economically beneficial or productive use of land." (Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 
1015 (1992)). 
46 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).  
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The constitutional protection of private property is arguably designed to uphold two important 
normative limitations constraining the legitimate use of government power to enrich some at the 
expense of others. First, in the event that a government measure pursuing a public purpose 
diminishes private property, the Takings Clause may require government to compensate the 
aggrieved parties such that the burdens of the public measure be "borne by the public as a whole" 
rather than by "some people alone".47 Second, and important for our analysis, the Takings Clause 
is aimed to bar government from effecting purely private wealth transfers, requiring the 
confiscating or diminishing measure to be aimed at pursuing public rather than purely private ends. 
According to Cass Sunstein, a central theme of the Constitution and of the Takings Clause is the 
prohibition of what he terms 'naked preferences' – the use of government power to distribute 
resources to a certain group solely due to the group's capability of exercising 'raw political 
power'.48 As Sunstein writes with regards to the Takings Clause: 
"A principal theme of the eminent domain clause cases is that government action cannot be used 
to serve purely private ends. Taking property from A in order to benefit B is the core example. The 
text of the clause attests to this theme in the basic requirement that a "public use" be shown before 
a taking is permitted, even with compensation. The function of this requirement is to prevent purely 
private wealth transfers".49  
We contend that anticompetitive government measures are especially prone to reflect the 'naked 
preferences' of special interest groups that are able to exercise their superior political influence to 
obtain the measures, allowing them to reap monopoly profits at the expense of the diffuse public. 
Due to their collective action problem, members of the diffuse public are incapable of exerting 
countervailing political influence, or even becoming aware of the measures and their distributive 
implications. In light of that, anticompetitive measures are suspect of effecting wealth transfers 
that are aimed to serve the private ends of favored interest groups rather than their purported public 
ends. We therefore argue that more rigorous scrutiny of anticompetitive measures under the 
constitutional protection of property is warranted, as the diffuse public's property interest in the 
purchasing power of their disposable income is especially susceptible to injury by the systemic 
capture failures of the public decision-making process. In section III, we shall outline the contours 
of the judicial test that we suggest could be used to scrutinize anticompetitive government 
measures under this framework. Due to the impracticality and arguable undesirability of 
substantive judicial review of the measures' purported public purposes, our proposed test will be 
focused on scrutinizing the process that led to their adoption as well as the government's choice of 
means. 
Our argument in favor of more rigorous judicial scrutiny of anticompetitive government measures 
relies on the contention that the private property interests that require judicially enforced 
constitutional protection are those most susceptible to be taken by purely private wealth transfers 
produced by the systemic failures of the public decision-making process. In the remainder of this 
section, we aim to show that this contention is nothing new. We argue that the constitutional 
                                                          
47 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
48 Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 8. 
49 Id. at 1724. 
13 
 
protection of private property was originally designed to respond to systemic failures of the 
political market.  
When James Madison, who initially proposed the Takings Clause, called for the constitutional 
protection of property and distinguished the types of property interests that warrant heightened 
constitutional protection, he was arguably motivated by the need to preempt private wealth 
transfers which he believed would be produced by another type of political market failure – 
namely, the tyranny of the majority. The opposite and no less pernicious political failure – what 
may be termed the tyranny of the minority – was simply not apparent at that moment. 
Madison's concern with government infringement on private property was tied to his concern with 
the dangers of partial, self-interested legislation, aimed to favor one interest at the expense of 
others. Madison's republican ideal of a government pursuing the public good, and refraining from 
partiality to one interest or the other,50 ostensibly guided his thought on the relation between 
government action and private property. According to Jennifer Nedelsky, Madison believed that 
"Tax policies and economic regulation might have some redistributive consequences, but it should 
not be their objective to benefit some at the expense of others. That was the sort of partial self-
interested legislation to be avoided."51 Recognizing that division into different "sects, factions and 
interests" is a feature of civilized society, Madison was weary of such "unjust laws" cautioning 
that under democratic forms of government "Debtors have defrauded their creditors. The landed 
interest has borne hard on the mercantile interest. The Holders of one species of property have 
thrown a disproportion of taxes on the holders of another species."52  
As his words suggest, Madison's perception of the dangers of partial and interested public action 
affecting private property were not limited only to physical dispossession of physical property. 
Madison's political philosophy exhibited a much broader conception of private property which 
also acknowledged indirect diminutions of value as violations of property rights. For example, in 
1786 he argued that paper money "affects rights of property as taking away equal value in land; 
[and] affects property without trial by jury."53 As Nedelsky writes:  
"Madison did not ... have a simple conception of property as land or even material goods. 
The "faculties of acquiring property" [the protection of which was, according to Federalist 
Ten, the first object of government] emphasized a subtle, nonmaterial dimension of 
property. And the legislative injustice he feared was not straightforward confiscation, but 
the more indirect infringements inherent in paper money and debtor relief law. Those 
interferences […] were both more likely and more invidious because they were less overt 
violations of property."54 
Furthermore, as Michael Treanor demonstrates, Madison viewed the constitutional protection of 
private property as serving a hortatory function, expressing a principle broader than the application 
                                                          
50 NEDELSKY, supra note 1, at 42-43. 
51 Id. at 31. 
52 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 3, at 135. 
53 Notes for Speech at the Virginia House of Assembly, November 1786, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 280 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901). 
54 NEDELSKY, supra note 1, at 30. 
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of its legal protection, which he believed government ought to adhere to - namely, that government 
should abstain from "unjustly" burdening private economic interests, even indirectly.55  
However, when Madison set out to include the protection against uncompensated government 
takings of private property in the Constitution, he ostensibly intended to limit its application only 
to physical dispossession of physical property interests, and not to indirect diminution, by 
government regulation and taxation, of numerous other economic interests of private parties.56 An 
important question could therefore be raised: If Madison's perception of the dangers of interested 
government infringements on private property was so broad, why did he choose to constitutionally 
protect only physical property interests against physical dispossessions?  
The answer could arguably be found in Madison's concerns relating to a particular failure of the 
political process – namely, the majoritarian failure. According to Treanor, Madison's writings and 
speeches indicate that "he believed that physical property needed greater protection than other 
forms of property because its owners were peculiarly vulnerable to majoritarian 
decisionmaking".57 Madison held that, in general, the procedural and institutional checks and 
balances provided by federalism were adequate to protect most property interests.58 For instance 
he wrote that: 
"A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for 
any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the 
Union than a particular member of it, in the same proportion as such a malady is more 
likely to taint a particular county or district than an entire State."59  
However, according to Treanor, Madison held that physical property interests required more than 
the procedural and structural protection that sufficed to mitigate the threats of government 
infringements on other forms of property. Landed interests required heightened substantive 
protection against infringement because of a majoritarian failure in the political process. Holding 
that "In all cases where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the 
minority are in danger,"60 Madison believed that universal suffrage and demographic growth will 
favor the interests of manufacturers over the interests of landowners in majoritarian decision-
making.61 As he wrote: 
"The three principal classes into which our citizens were divisible were the landed, the 
commercial, and the manufacturing… It is particularly requisite therefore that the interests 
of one or two of them should not be left entirely to the care or the impartiality of the third."62  
                                                          
55 William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. 
L. REV. 782, 819, 840 (1995). 
56 Id. at 791-97. 
57 Id. at 847. 
58 Id. at 841-843. 
59 The Federalist No. 10, at 83 (James Madison). 
60  THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 3, at 135. 
61 Treanor, supra note 55, at 850.; Sunstein, Naked Preferences supra note 8, at 1691. 
62 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 3, at 123. 
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We may also suggest that emphasis on protection against physical takings is aligned with the 
counter-majoritarian conception of constitutional protection in another important way. Single 
government measures that physically take property tend to affect specific individuals such as those 
who happen to own particular plots of land, while indirect infringements by regulation and macro-
economic policy tend to affect much larger groups. Thus, Madison may have held that the latter 
type of takings does not warrant a constitutional remedy, as he assumed that large groups would 
be sufficiently capable of protecting themselves against such takings through the regular 
mechanisms of representative government.    
More generally, it could be argued that protecting the minority of landowners from the landless 
masses was the underlying concern of the framers of the U.S. Constitution. The installation of a 
complex and diversified system of government, supermajority amendment requirements, and a 
judicial review mechanism to protect constitutional rights responded to concerns that a landless 
majority would use its numerical superiority to redistribute property.63 Many contemporary legal 
scholars view the same majoritarian failure as the primary source of justification for judicial 
review.64  
Madison's decision to grant landed individual interests special constitutional protection was thus 
ostensibly guided by a criterion focused on political process failure. Madison believed that the 
primary defect of republican government is the majoritarian failure, and that landed and physical 
interests are particularly susceptible to be injured by it. He therefore held that these property 
interests ought to be protected by an institution that is insulated from the majoritarian failures – 
namely, judicially enforced constitutional property rights. He presumed that the broad public 
whose property interests could be affected indirectly by government measures was capable of 
effectively securing its interests through the system of representative government and the structural 
protections of federalism.  
However, Madison did not anticipate the severe systemic failure of interest group capture, that 
enables interest groups to shape public policy that benefits their commercial interests to the 
detriment of the broad unorganized public.65 Interestingly, Madison seems to have become more 
aware of this failure at a later period, in light of developments related to Alexander Hamilton's 
economic plans in the 1790s. According to Nedelsky, 
"At the time of the convention, Madison devoted almost no attention to the potential threat 
of the wealthy using their power to promote their own unjust plans. […] he thought 
Hamilton's plans for redemption of public securities would unjustly favor wealthy 
speculators. And he not only opposed Hamilton's plan for the bank as unconstitutional, he 
                                                          
63 See discussions of the political structures designed to curb such conflict of interests in: The Federalist No. 10 (James 
Madison); The Federalist No. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison). 
64 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 
(1962); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ch. 6 (1980). 
65 Neil Komesar used the term 'minoritarian bias' to describe this failure. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT 
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 269 (1997). 
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was appalled at the spectacle of men within the government deriving personal gain from 
governmental measures, and the wealthy successfully exerting pressure from without".66 
Accordingly, we argue that in light of the political market failure of interest group capture, the 
property interests of the diffuse citizens are no less susceptible to injury by interested public 
decisions than the property interests of the minority of landowners are susceptible to injury by 
majoritarian public decisions. Therefore, both types of property interests require the protection of 
constitutional property rights enforced by courts, which are not only insulated from the 
majoritarian failure, but are also insulated from interest group influence to a greater extent than 
the political branches of government. As Richard Posner noted, judges are better shielded from the 
pressures of special interests, as they have life tenure, fixed salaries and procedural rules that limit 
their contact with interest groups.67   
We therefore suggest that anticompetitive government measures ought to be conceived as 
potentially unconstitutional takings of diffuse citizens' private property, as they may be aimed to 
effect purely private wealth transfers rather than to promote public ends. In section III, we shall 
outline a judicial test that could be used to scrutinize and possibly invalidate anticompetitive 
government measures if they are not justified as necessary to promoting their purported public 
purposes.  
 
III – The Constitutional Test for Protecting the Majority’s Property Against Anticompetitive 
Government Measures 
In this section, we outline a framework for constitutional protection against purely private wealth 
transfers affected by anticompetitive government measures and discuss its practical desirability. 
We shall suggest that anticompetitive measures should be invalidated if special interest influence 
could be found to be involved in their adoption, and if they are not necessary to promote their 
purported public purpose. Accordingly, we will present a test for judicial scrutiny of suspect anti-
competitive government measures.  
As we established above, anticompetitive government measures are particularly suspect of being 
aimed to serve the private interests of special interest groups rather a legitimate public purpose, 
due to a systemic failure of the political decision-making process. We therefore suggest that they 
should be scrutinized by the courts under the 'public use' requirement of the Takings Clause. To 
explain how we arrived at our proposed test, we shall start by discussing some straightforward 
alternatives.  
At first glance, it may be argued that the influence of interest groups on the adoption of an 
anticompetitive measure, if it could be established, should suffice in and of itself to conclude that 
the measure in question simply fails to meet the public use requirement, as it is essentially aimed 
to promote the ends of private parties rather than its purported public ends. However, in order to 
discern when such measures should be seen as serving purely private ends, it is not enough to 
                                                          
66 Nedelsky, supra note 1, at 44. 
67 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 501 (1973). 
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examine whether they were produced by the favored group's political influence. Rather, it is 
necessary to turn to substantive normative standards that determine what purposes, and under what 
conditions, may justify the distributive effects of the measure. Einer Elhauge, in his criticism of 
the use of interest group theory to justify more intrusive judicial review,68 rightly argues that we 
cannot distinguish between proper and improper interest group influence without an independent 
normative baseline. For example, Elhauge demonstrates that normative standards of social 
desirability are required in order to judge the legitimacy of the political influence of a racial 
minority seeking to obtain affirmative action policy which will favor its members at the expense 
of the members of the diffuse racial majority.69 Without a normative baseline, we cannot explain 
why some would view such political influence as legitimate while judging the influence of a 
wealthy minority seeking to prevent distributive public policy as illegitimate. Therefore, the fact 
of special interest influence on the adoption of a measure can only serve to justify a heightened 
level of scrutiny of the measure's purported purpose, but not to render the measure unjustified as 
such. 
If so, to judge the permissibility of a particular anticompetitive measure under the public use 
requirement, we may need to ask whether the expected benefits of the measure outweigh its harm 
to the diffuse public's private property. Such a comparison of costs and benefits was suggested by 
Frank Michelman's economic analysis of the public use requirement.70 According to Michelman, 
if the measure's benefits exceed its costs, including the costs of a hypothetical compensation 
scheme that would make the aggrieved parties indifferent to their loss, a court could determine that 
the measure meets the public use requirement. If the costs exceed the benefits, however, a court 
could determine that the measure does not pursue a public purpose.71  
However, such a judicial test of public use is arguably impractical and undesirable. First, we may 
cast doubt on the competency of courts to measure the costs and benefits associated with 
anticompetitive government measures. Quantifying the loss incurred by consumers along with the 
efficiency losses associated with anticompetitive measures and weighing them against expected 
benefits which may be intangible and speculative, would require broad economic policy analysis, 
an expertise that judges may not possess. More importantly, such a comparison requires value 
judgments as to the worth of the measure's purported benefits and the permissibility of imposing 
any certain amount of loss on private parties for the sake of their attainment. These judgments 
must invoke and apply a conception of the legitimate functions and ends of government, a task 
that today's courts are reluctant to undertake.72 
Indeed, since the demise of the Lochner73 era and its interpretation of "substantive due process",74 
a time when economic regulations, including minimum wage and child labor laws, were struck 
                                                          
68 Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1993). 
69 Id. at 51-53. 
70 Frank I.  Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just 
Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1195 (1967).  
71 Id. 
72 Thomas W.  Merrill, Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 66-68 (1986-1987). 
73 The period known in American legal history as the 'Lochner era' is named after the case of Lochner v. New York 
198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
74 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
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down as unconstitutional, the Supreme Court stressed that it does not "sit as a superlegislature to 
weigh the wisdom of legislation,"75 and held that legislative bodies should "have broad scope to 
experiment with economic problems."76 The prevailing democratic theory holds that legislatures 
are the appropriate institution for the definition of the appropriate ends of government, and in the 
context of takings today's courts are "exceedingly deferential to legislative definitions of a 
permissible public use."77 As Justice Douglas held in the case of Berman v. Parker: "Subject to 
specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been 
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive."78 
Interestingly, it could be argued that the ghost of Lochner is part of the reason why the problem of 
anticompetitive government measures remains unaddressed by courts until this day. The Parker 
decision that introduced the antitrust "state action doctrine" was a child of the post-Lochner and 
new deal era, which exhibited greater judicial deference to state regulation. Some have suggested 
that the doctrine "can be seen as a necessary concession to anticompetitive state regulation to avoid 
a return to the Lochner era."79 Since then, lawyers such as Merrick Garland argued against the use 
of interest group theory to justify judicial scrutiny of anticompetitive economic regulation under 
federal antitrust law, asserting that this would amount to a dangerous return to Lochnerism.80 
In light of, and in accord with, the prevailing deference of today's courts to legislative 
determinations of permissible government ends, we search instead for an alternative and arguably 
more appropriate framework that would allow judicial scrutiny of anti-competitive and arguably 
unconstitutional anticompetitive government measures under the Takings Clause. We believe that 
it is possible to formulate such a judicial test, that takes the permissibility of a measure's purported 
public purpose as given but does not abstain from ascertaining whether it is aimed to advance 
private rather than public ends. We draw upon Thomas Merrill's suggestion that the public use 
requirement could be reinterpreted to allow courts to scrutinize government's choice of means 
rather than the permissibility of the taking's ends.81 Such a task is arguably more accurate and 
better suited to the institutional competency of courts, and hence more desirable under the 
prevalent theory of democratic governance.  
The judicial test we propose for the review of anticompetitive government measures includes two 
prongs. First, the court should scrutinize the decision-making process to determine whether the 
adoption of the anticompetitive measure was influenced by special interests that stand to benefit 
from it. The court may consider evidence for the involvement of interest groups in the process, as 
well as their relationships with decision-makers who took part in the process. Evidence that 
                                                          
75 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952). 
76 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). 
77 Merrill , supra note 72, at 63; For a recent example of the deferential interpretation of the public use requirement 
see Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2660 (2005). 
78 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
79 James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Conference in Honor of Joseph Brodley: Panel III: Antitrust and 
the Obama Administration: U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public 
Restraints on Competition, 90 B.U.L. REV. 1555, 1570 (2010) 
80 Merrick Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 YALE L. REV. 486, 
490 (1987). 
81 Merrill, supra note 72, at 71. 
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decision-makers considered the anticompetitive effects of the measure, and the transparency of the 
process, may also be given weight by the reviewing court. Second, the court should scrutinize the 
choice of means available to the government. If the purported public purpose of the anticompetitive 
measure could be achieved by a less harmful means to the affected public, it could be concluded, 
even without clear and direct evidence, that the measure's real aim was to affect a private wealth 
transfer  in violation of the public use requirement. Indeed, even if unintentional, an unnecessary 
transfer of wealth from some citizens to others should not be permitted by the constitution.  
Invalidating anticompetitive government measures on the basis of the proposed test is justified by 
the contention that if a less harmful means was available to achieve the same purported purpose of 
the measure, and if the decision-making process that led to the adoption of the measure was tainted 
with the political influence of the benefitted party, the reasonable presumption is that the 
government measure transfers wealth from the diffuse public to the benefited party for the sake of 
the latter's purely private ends. Invalidation is the appropriate remedy for the elimination of those 
unjustified wealth transfers, as affording compensation to the members of the diffuse public is both 
impractical and undesirable – following a scheme of compensation, the diffuse public will 
nevertheless end up paying for the monopoly profits of the benefited interest group through their 
tax dollars. The more rigorous level of scrutiny is justified by the concern that due to the systemic 
failure of the political process, anticompetitive measures are likely to reflect the 'naked preferences' 
of interest groups while purporting to promote legitimate public purposes. As Sunstein argued, 
"Heightened scrutiny is triggered by a concern that in the circumstances it is especially likely that 
the measure under review reflects a naked preference,"82 and is justified by the perception that the 
groups infringed upon "lack the political power to protect themselves against factional tyranny."83 
Accordingly, the court may review "government claims that a public value is being served,"84 
inter-alia by searching for less restrictive alternatives in which government could have promoted 
the public value, seeing that the "availability of such alternatives […] suggests that the public value 
justification is a façade."85 
Our proposed judicial test is not only pertinent but also practical. The task of deciding whether 
government measures have an anticompetitive effect is clearly within the capacity of courts, as 
they are routinely tasked with such analysis in the context of antitrust law; deciding whether an 
interest group was behind a particular anticompetitive measure is also within the reach of courts, 
as demonstrated in several judgments that reflected no hesitation to identify such influences;86 and 
courts are experienced with determining whether government employed the least restrictive means 
                                                          
82 Sunstein, Naked Preferences supra note 8, at 1700. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 1699. 
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86 For example New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 115-16 (1978) (Justice Stevens' dissenting 
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in various constitutional contexts.87 As Krier and Steric have shown,88 in adjudicating takings 
cases, state courts scrutinize the political processes that had generated government regulation and 
are likely to find takings in cases in which the government actors responsible for harm to 
landowners are least likely to be politically accountable. 
The feasibility of implementing our proposal can also be demonstrated by numerous incidents 
where the FTC intervened in the process of regulation by advocating against anticompetitive 
government measures that would unnecessarily inflict economic harms on the diffuse public.89 
These interventions show that it is possible to objectively identify anticompetitive measures and 
to ascertain whether less restrictive means are available to achieve their purported public goals. 
For example, the FTC warned several state legislatures against promulgating certain statutory 
exemptions to antitrust laws that would have allowed physicians to collectively bargain with 
managed health plans. Drawing on evidence from similar cases, the FTC concluded that such 
exemptions would lead to an anticompetitive outcome, increasing costs and limiting consumer 
access to care, and argued that the measure is not likely to achieve its purported public purpose of 
improving the quality of care, which according to their analysis "could be accomplished through 
less anticompetitive means".90 In another instance, the FTC convinced the governor of New York 
to veto a so-called "sale below cost" bill that would have prohibited crude oil producers and 
refiners from selling motor fuels below refiner costs, thereby restraining competition between 
these suppliers, and possibly harming consumers without providing a countervailing benefit.91 The 
FTC's comments argued that the public purpose of the measure, which was actually to protect 
competition, could be achieved by less anticompetitive means through existing federal antitrust 
law.92 The FTC’s intervention in these and in other cases shows that it is possible to objectively 
demonstrate the existence of the elements of the proposed test.93  
A possible objection that can be raised against our proposal is that the judicial review of 
anticompetitive measures may suffer from the very same failure that inheres in the political system. 
Although the judiciary is the branch of government least susceptible to interest group influence, it 
is not clear that the diffuse group of citizens is more capable of overcoming its collective action 
problem in courts than it is in the public political process. One could argue that challenges to 
anticompetitive government measures would rarely make it to courts. That is because such 
measures would remain below the radar of the harmed individuals or because challenging such 
measures would require some sacrifice by some of the harmed individuals whereas the benefit 
                                                          
87 Such an inquiry is also the task of international tribunals who, under the rules of international trade law, are called 
upon to assess whether domestic interest groups obtained regulation to limit imports that are “more trade-restrictive 
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would spread to the entire diffuse group of consumers at a low reward per capita. That would make 
it irrational for individual members of the group to bear the costs of litigation.  
Indeed, the collective action problem inherent in the costs of litigating such cases calls for 
attention. However, relatively speaking, courts pose to diffuse plaintiffs much simpler barriers to 
collective action than does the political process. Crowdfunding94  and class actions95 could be 
successfully used to facilitate overcoming these barriers. Besides that, we believe that the effects 
of the availability of the proposed framework of judicial review goes beyond the particular 
challenges to anticompetitive measures that could be brought under it. The remedy of ex-post 
invalidation of anticompetitive government measures is aimed to preempt this type of interested 
wealth transfers and to mitigate the capture failure ex-ante. The availability of judicial review that 
could invalidate such measures should impel decision-makers to conduct more inclusive and 
transparent decision-making processes, to give weight to the interests of the diffuse public in 
competitive prices, and to reduce the involvement of special interest groups in the shaping of public 
policy that affects the diffuse public. The requirement that the decision-making process take 
competition into account should give the federal antitrust agencies more tools to challenge 
anticompetitive decisions before they are adopted and should produce more public information 
that could assist the diffuse citizens in overcoming their collective action problem and empowering 
them to influence public decisions through the political process.  
 
 
IV - Conclusion 
In this Essay we argued that the jurisprudence on takings must extend to apply the Takings Clause 
to the protection of the diffuse majority of citizens from regulations that transfer wealth to special 
interests who manage to shape governmental anti-competitive measures. Our point of departure 
was the observation that the political system is prone to systemically produce purely private wealth 
transfers form the diffuse majority to concentrated interest groups due to the disparity of political 
power between the parties. Due to this systemic failure, it is justified – and consistent with the 
original intent of the Framers – to afford heightened constitutional protection to the property 
interests of the diffuse public. Conceptualizing the purchasing power of citizens’ disposable 
income as constitutionally protected property, could safeguard it against regulatory measures that 
cater to special interests.  
One may ask why this proposition has not emerged before. Surely, this cannot be attributed solely 
to the rigidity of the takings doctrine. After all, while the Takings Clause was originally intended 
and interpreted to apply only to physical dispossession, the concept of 'regulatory takings' has 
ultimately been recognized in the jurisprudence.96 Additionally, property rights were invoked in 
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political resistance to environmental regulations that restricted land use and indirectly decreased 
property value.97 Despite all these, the concept of ‘regulatory taking’ as a ‘taking’ was never 
extended beyond the protection of certain politically savvy and influential sectors.  
We believe that the constitutional void that this Essay has identified in the constitutional protection 
of the majority’s property could be explained by the same collective action problem that precluded 
the diffuse public from influencing government. Whereas heterogenic and relatively small groups 
of actors have always been able to mobilize political power to protect their property, the large and 
diffuse group of citizens who wish to benefit from price and choice available in competitive 
markets could not overcome the collective action problem of comprehending the source of their 
loss, let alone to name it and to collectively demand its protection under the law. This is nothing 
new, of course. Property rights were always defined also in the 'political market', where different 
groups possess varying degrees of influence, and not only in the economic market.98 Historically, 
as Mancur Olson elaborates in The Rise and Decline of Nations, because smaller groups could 
organize themselves more quickly than their opponents within the nascent Westphalian system of 
sovereign states, they were able to use the state as the instrument for obtaining a disproportionate 
share of the domestic resources.99 
Perhaps more fundamentally, it might be the case that the same collective action problem 
prevented the group of diffuse citizens from conceptualizing their economic interests as rights 
entitled to constitutional protection. An interesting contemporary analogy of failure to articulate 
entitlements can be drawn from Eric Posner's and Glen Weyl's recent proposal to reconceptualize 
data in the digital market as owned by the users rather than by the social media and other companies 
that provide users services “for free” while selling the data to third parties.100 So far the market 
remains at that equilibrium as consumers are not aware of the value of the data they are producing 
and even if they are, they struggle to act in unison to demand their share from the service providers. 
As in the case of consumer data, reconceptualizing the claim to protecting competitive markets as 
supported under the constitution can help members of diffuse groups to overcome the problem of 
collective action and demand what is theirs. 
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